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ABSTRACT 
In 2010, Kenya promulgated a new constitution that bore all the hallmarks of progress and 
which is widely considered transformative. One stark example of this was the unprecedented 
inclusion of Socio - Economic Rights under in the constitution under Article 43, thereby 
granting very high legal status to these rights which have been traditionally considered the 
results of proper social and govenunental order crystallised in protection and fulfilment of 
civil and political rights. This in effect created the possibility for a plethora of trans formative 
jurisprudence in the Kenyan legal landscape with the judiciary leading the way through 
proper interpretation of the law concerning human rights and defining contours of 
enforcement of the same. 
This new order brings with it novel remedies for compliance in the event of a breach of 
economic and social rights. One such remedy is the Structural Interdict (supervisory orders) 
whjch allows a court to monitor compliance with its orders over a specific and determined 
period of time after a declaration of rights has been made. Although now nipped in the bud, 
this remedy was in use in Kenya and increasingly gained legal notoriety up until the Court of 
Appeal capped its use in the la:1dmark case of Kenya Airports Authority v J\l!itu-Bell We{fare 
Society & 2 others [2016} eKLR (herein after referred to as 'The Mitu-Bell Case'). 
This dissertation analyses that decision in light of the transfom1ative ideals of the Kenyan 
constitution and proffers a contrary perspective. It considers the judgement of the court of 
appeal, although well-reasoned, severely retrogressive and inimical to the ideals of progress 
espoused by the Constitution of Kenya 2010. The arguments of the Court of Appeal are 
considered, analysed and countered; hence the case for structural interdicts in Kenya. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
The Structural Interdict is one of the legal remedies available in constitutional law litigation. 
It is a type of injunction requiring the government to report back to the court at regular 
intervals about the steps taken to comply with the constitution. 1 As a matter of principle, it 
gives a comi authority not just to issue orders with respect to matters before it, but also to 
oversee and superintend their implementation. Its ongoing nature is facilitated by the court's 
retention of jurisdiction, and sometimes by the court's active participation in the 
implementation of the decree.2 Hence where a court issues orders flowing from a judgement 
or ruling, it will reserve a sort of 'supervisory jurisdiction' in their implementation. 
In 2010, Kenya promulgated a new constitution which has been touted as 'one of the most 
progressive in the world' 3 and which draws heavy influence from the constitution of South 
Africa. For this reason, South Atrican jurisprudence concerning the instutionalization of this 
legal remedy infonns the legal substance of this of this disse1iation. The Constitution of 
Kenya boasts a very robust bill of rights which may be argued to competently guarantee all 
the rights attaching to a citizen of any democratic state. In drafting the Consti1ution, 
inspiration was sought from other jurisdictions and some of the provisions clearly mirror the 
foreign laws from which they were drawn. For example, the Bill of Rights clearly shows 
influences from the Constitution of South Africa with respect to a general limitations clause 
that contains similar wording and also, decisions of the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
in respect of socio-economic rights were incorporated.4 
The implementation of the structural interdict as a constitutional remedy has not quite been 
robust in the Kenyan legal scene. After a few attempts by both the High Court and the 
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal has resisted the application of the structural interdict and 
eloquently laid grounds upon which this remedy has been capped. 
1Roach K, Crafting Remedies for Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in the Road To A Remedy: 
Current Issues In The Litigation Of Economic, Social And Cultural Rights p 111, 113. 
2 Mbazira C, Litigating Socio-Economic Rights In South Africa: A choice between corrective and distributive 
justice, Pretoria Law Press, 2009. 
3Mutunga W,Chief Justice and President of Supreme Court of Kenya, 'Keynote speech for the Africa and 
International Law Conference Albany Law School, at 9.15 on April 13 , 2012 
4 Waruguru Kaguongo, ' Introductory Note on Kenya '-




In the case of Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016} eKLR 
the Court of Appeal sitting in Nairobi on the 1st of July, questioned the nature of structural 
interdicts and their recent use on Kenyan jurisprudence. The court arrived at a decision which 
in effect ended the use of this remedy in Kenya citing the following reasons; 
a) The Civil Procedure Act and rules do not provide for such procedure. 5 
b) Structural interdicts allow delegation of judicial function which is an abdication of 
judicial responsibility. 6 
c) Article 23(3) carmot not be construed to permit the High Court to borrow legislations 
from other countries and through judicial interpretation embed them into the laws of 
Kenya.7 
It is these precise grounds that this dissertation challenges by making counter arguments for 
each of them and which counter arguments consist the case for structural interdicts in Kenya. 
1.2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Despite the promulgation of a progressive constitution with a robust bill of rights, an 
mdependently functioning judiciary and spi1ited attempts by both the High Court and the 
Supreme Court to issue the structural interdict, this remedy still faces obstacles in 
implementation given that the Court of Appeal has unequivocally capped the suggested 
application of this remedy in the now famous 'Mitu-Bell' case. 
Effectively, the dissertation challenges the decision of the Court of Appeal usmg the 
following arguments: 
The structural interdict fosters present and future compliance of govenm1ent with its 
constitutional duties . 
Q Because of its very nature, it will increase judicial independence and involvement in 
remedying breaches of government agencies and if effectively applied, will buttress 
the separation of powers. 
e It curbs arbitrariness of government agencies which may be in conflict with the law 
and hence is a check for government inaction and excesses. 
5 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR, para 68 
6 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eK.LR, para 77 
7 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eK.LR, para 112 
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1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This dissertation achieves the following specific objectives: 
• Explaining the concept of the structural interdict and the achievements that may be 
expected with its inclusion in Kenya in protection and fulfilment of socio-economic 
rights. 
e Demonstrating the legal and institutional framework through which the structural 
interdict may be enshrined and implemented respectively. 
o Examining the decision of the Court of Appeal in the 'Mitu-Bell case' and proposing 
an argument why it is retrogressive under a progressive Constitution. 
• Rendering an informed and factual analysis on the extent to which courts can adopt 
foreign comparative jurisprudence and general rules of international law. 
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The dissertation answers the following questions: 
$ What is the immediate necessity of the structural interdict? 
• Why is the Court of Appeal judgement in the 'Mitu-Bell' case, inimical to the 
effective protection and fulfilment of socio-economic rights in Kenya? 
How does the application of the structural interdict augur with the separation of 
powers in light of increased judicial supervision of other government agencies. 
1.5. HYPOTHESIS 
It is the considered hypothesis of this dissertation that: 
The enshrinement of the structural interdict in Kenyan law enhances the protection and 
fulfilment of socio-economic rights, while at the same time promoting judicial authority 
without prejudicing the separation of powers. 
1.6. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3 
Christopher Mbazira in his book Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa in chapter 
six talks at length about the structural interdict, its nature and function. He explains that 'the 
structural interdict has been used by the courts in a manner that goes against traditional 
perceptions of the role of the courts as envisioned under the theory of corrective justice.8 It 
has enabled judges to discard their position as mere umpires and to assume positions which 
make them active participants in the dispute. 9 The courts have made not only extensive 
judicial decrees, but have also overseen their implementation. 10 This has generated much 
controversy and objection to the structural interdict as an appropriate relief. This is because it 
forces courts to do things that they are ordinarily not expected to do.' 11 He however clarifies 
that it is a remedy which ordinarily is of a last resort nature and even if it must be used, there 
are norms and guidelines that must necessarily be employed in issuing them. 12 He has 
discussed these norms and principles at length. 
Iain Currie & Johan de Waal in their book 'Limitation of Rights, in The Bill of Rights 
Handbook suggest the five characteristics that make up Structural Interdicts. 13 
The first step is issuance of a declaration by the Court identifying how the government has 
infringed an individual or group's constitutional rights or otherwise failed to comply with its 
constitutional obligations. 14 
Second, the court mandates government compliance with constitutional responsibilities. 15 
Third, the government is ordered to prepare and submit a comprehensive rep01i, usually 
under oath, to the court on a preset date. This report, which should explicate the 
government's action plan for remedying the challenged violations, gives "the responsible 
state agency the opportunity to choose the means of compliance" with the constitutional 
rights in question, rather than the court itself developing or dictating a solution. 16 The 
submitted plan is typically expected "to be tied to a period within which it is to be 
implemented or a series of deadlines by which identified milestones have to be reached." 17 
8 Mbazira, Litigating Socio-Economic Rights In South Africa, 165 
9 Mbazira, Litigating Socio-Economic Rights In South Africa, 165 
10 Mbazira; Litigating Socio-Economic Rights In South Africa, 165 
11 Mbazira, Litigating Socio-Economic Rights In South Africa, 165. 
12 Mbazira, Litigating Socio-Economic Rights In South Africa, 165 
13 Currie .I & De Waal .J, Remedies in the Bill of Rights Handbook, 1999 
14 Currie & de Waal, Remedies in The Bill OfRights Handbook, 219 
15 Currie & de Waal, Remedies in The Bill OfRights Handbook, 219 
16 Currie & de Waal , Remedies in The Bill OfRights Handbook, 219 
17 Currie & de Waal, Remedies in The Bill Of Rights Handbook, 219 
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Fourth, once the required report is presented, the court evaluates whether the proposed plan in 
fact remedies the constitutional infringement and whether it brings the government into 
compliance with its constitutional obligations. 18 This stage of a structural interdict may 
involve multiple government presentations depending on how the litigants respond to the 
proposed plan and, more significantly, whether the court finds the plan to be constitutionally 
sound. After court approval, a final order (integrating the government plan and any court-
ordered amendments) is issued. 19 
Dr Mutakha Kangu also states that the transformative nature of the constitution lies in its 
ability to address the systemic and structural problems of the Kenyan society.20 Structural 
interdicts or injunctions are therefore appropriate remedies that can be fashioned to address 
demonstrated government inaction or systematic and structural problems in society.Z 1 
This dissertation relies on these sources of literature together with other numerous and 
informative sources in developing an understanding of the nature of Socio-economic rights 
and the role of structural interdicts in their enforcement. 
1.7. THEORETICAL FRAlVIEWORK 
This dissertation employs the ideas of John Locke presented in the Second Treatise on 
Government in developing a theoretical framework for the case for the structural interdict. 
Particular regard is had to chapter nine of the treatise in which he identifies three elements 
which constitute the civil society to wit: 22 
a. An established, settled, known law, received and accepted by common consent as the 
standard of right and wrong and as the common measure to decide all controversies. 
b. A known and impartial judge, with authority to settle all differences according to the 
established law. 
c. A power to back up and support a correct sentence, and to enforce it properly. 
He states that in the state of nature, man is lord of his possessions but cannot prevent others 
from taking them. Hence the need for uniting and giving prerogative to a government that 
affords them the protection that they need. This can only be done with the existence of a law 
18 Currie & de Waal, Remedies in The Bill OfRights Handbook, 219 
19 Currie & de Waal, Remedies in The Bill OfRights Handbook, 219 
20 Mutakha K, 'Remedies In Constitutional Litigation Under The Kenyan Constitution Of 2010' LSK 
continuous Professional Development Seminar, Green Hills HoteL, Nyeri, 15th to 16th September, 2016 
21 Mutakha K, 'Remedies In Constitutional Litigation Under The Kenyan Constitution Of2010' , 2016. 
22 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government' - <http://W\vw.earlymodemtexts .com/assets/pdfs/ locke 1689a.pdf> 
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by which everyone abides. It is arguable in light of this explanation that these 'possessions of 
man' in the context of an 'established, settled, known law, received and accepted by 
common consent as the standard of right and wrong', are human rights and particularly 
socio-economic rights (for the purposes of the study). The 'known and impartial judge' is a 
court of law or largely speaking the judicature, which guarantees these rights according to the 
established law. While in the third aspect where he is referring to criminals and those who 
breach the law, 'power to backup and support a correct sentence' is extrapolated to mean 
the enforcement of court decision and judgement. 
The foregoing explanation constitutes a theoretical framework upon which the case for 
structural interdicts may rely. While the executive or government agencies and administrative 
institutions are capable of breaching the law especially in the context of protection and 
fulfilment of socio-economic rights, the judiciary in an action brought before a court, can 
then declare rights of parties affected and superintend the correction of the breach giving rise 
to such action. 
1.8. DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This study is based entirely on desktop research. Foreign case law and Kenyan case law are 
heavily relied upon. The Constitution of Kenya, Acts of Parliament and books consist 
primary sources while intemet reports, libraries and journal articles do the office of secondary 
sources of data. 
1.9. CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
Chapter One - Introduction to the Study 
6 
This chapter giVes the background of the study, the problem, the literature review, the 
objectives and questions, the hypothesis, and the design methodology of the study. 
Chapter Two -Theoretical Framework 
This chapter considers the theory of Social Contract as espoused by John Locke and it's 
connect with the concept of Constitutionalism. The substantive content of these two distinct 
concepts is used as a foundational framework to explain the existence and enforcement of 
Socio-Economic rights within a legal regime. 
Chapter Three -The State and Socio-Economic Rights 
This chapter explains the interface between the nature of socio-economic rights and the role 
of the state in respecting, protecting and fulfilling these rights. 
Chapter Four- The case for Structural Interdicts in Kenya 
This chapter considers the landmark Court of Appeal judgement in the Mitu-Bell case which 
capped the use of Structural Interdicts and makes an argument in response to the justitications 
given by the honourable court. In so doing, both local and foreign jurisprudence is 
considered. 
Chapter Five- Conclusion and Recommendations. 
This is a succinct restatement of the case for the inclusion of structural interdicts in Kenya..'l 
law, the benefits of this remedy and role oflegal practitioners in advocating for the same. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORTICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY (SOCIAL 
CONTRACT AND CONSTITUTIONALISM) 
2.0. INTRODUCTION 
The structural interdict is a means of enforcement of human rights which can only exist and 
be asserted by law. Rule of law then becomes an absolute which must precede the sucessful 
assertion of human rights . There is however no single accepted definition of the principle of 
rule of law and for the purposes of this dissertation, the definition given by the UN Secretary 
General is most relevant. The Secretary General describes it as 'a principle of governance in 
which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
·adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It 
requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, 
equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, 
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency. ' 23 From this definition, it is clear that 
rule of law consists in strict adherence of all persons including state to publicly 
promulgated and accepted laws. 
It is with this understanding that the enshrinement and enforcement in law of human rights 
must be construed. There is no rule of law within societies if human rights are not protected 
and vice versa; human rights cannot be protected in societies without a strong rule of law. 24 
The rule of law is the implementation mechanism for human rights, turning them fi·om a 
principle into a reality.25 
The impression of an inward active principle is to natural things, what the promulgation of 
law is to men: because law, by being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of 
human actions. 26 The very idea of obedience presupposes knowledge of that which is to be 
obeyed, without which knowledge there could be only the coincidence, never the obligation, 
23 Report of the Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, 
23 August 2004, 6 
24 <https://www.un.ondruleoflaw/rule-of-law-and-human-rights/> accessed on 15 December 2017 
25 <https:/lwww.un.org/ruleoflaw/rule-of-law-and-human-rights/> accessed on 15 December 2017 
26 Aquinas T , 'Summa Theologica -Part I-II, Q93. Art 5' 
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of obedience. 27 
This is a basic description of the idea of social contract. It is an actual or hypothetical 
compact agreement between the ruled and their rulers, defining the rights and duties of each. 
In primeval times, according to the theory, individuals were born into an anarchic state of 
nature, which was happy or unhappy according to the particular version. 28 They then, by 
exercising natural reason, formed a society (and a government) by means of a contract among 
themselves. 29 
The rule of law is almost synonymous to constitutionalism which generally speaking is the 
idea of government by law. It is the proposition that a government derives authority from a 
constitution and limits the exercise of this authority to the extents given in that constitution. 
Hence the two concepts of existence of governement through social contract and the limits of 
exercise of power by that government, form the theoretical bedrock for the discussion around 
structural interdicts and human rights. In this regard they are discussed respectively as 
follows, but must not be read disjunctively. 
2.1. JOHN LOCKE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
In his famous Second Treatise of Government, John Locke begins by describing his 
understanding of the state of nature as being one in which men are perfectly free to order 
their actions, and dispose of their possessions and themselves, in any way they like, without 
asking anyone's permission.30 He also characterises this state as one of equality in which no-
one has more power and authority than anyone else. 31 He explains the existence of civil 
society saying that 'though in the state of nature man has an unrestricted right to his 
possessions, he is far from assured that he will be able to get the use of them, because they 
are constantly exposed to invasion by other so his hold on the property he has in this state is 
very unsafe, very insecure32 
This makes him willing to leave a state in which he is very free, but which is full of fears and 
continual dangers; and not unreasonably he looks for others with whom he can enter into a 
27 Bailey G, 'The Promulgation of law' America Political Science Review Journal, Vol35 Issue 6, December 
1941 ,1059-1084 
28 <https://www. britannica.com/topic/social-contract> accessed on 15 December 2017 
29 <https://www.britannica.com/topic/socia1-contract> accessed on 15 December 2017 
30 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government', 4 
31 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government', 4 
32 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government', 123 
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society for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which he calls by 
the general name 'property'. 33 
He then describes the state of nature as lacking in many things but only expounds on three 
which may conversely be adapted as the characteristics of a civil society to wit; 
1. An established, settled, known law, received and accepted by common consent as the 
standard of right and wrong and as the common measure to decide all controversies. 34 
2. A known and impartial judge, with authority to settle all differences according to the 
established law. 35 
3. Power to back up and support a correct sentence, and to enforce it properly.36 
Already he is characterising civil society as a necessary arrangement where men put 
themselves under government in the hope of preservation of their property. 37 
Generally under the social contract theory, those in society agree to cede individual 
sovereignty and independence which exists in the state of nature and agree to be bound by a 
government in exchange for the protection of their rights, liberties and estates from 
interference by fellow men and even govenunent itself.38 The great purpose for which men 
enter into society is to be safe and at peace in their use of their prope1iy; and the great 
instrument by which this is to be achieved is the laws established in that society. 39 
Having established the necessity of government, it follows that the 'possessions of man' 
which he seeks to protect by consenting to a government and the 'established, settled, known 
law, are strictly what that law prescribes as belonging to him 40 . In the context of modern day 
government, a bold inference is made that these possessions are the equal of human rights 
contained in a bill of 1ights in the constitution of a state.41 For example under the Kenyan 
constitution, the Bill of Rights is contained in Chapter 4 and is considered under Article 19 
(1) as an integral part of Kenya's democratic state and is the framework for social, economic 
and cultural policies.42 
33 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government', 123 
34 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government ', 124 
35 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government' , 125 
36 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government', 126 
37 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government' , 124 
38 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government' , 134 
39 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government' , 134 
40 Locke J, ' Second Treatise of Government' , 124 
41 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government' , 124 
42 Article 19, Constitution of Kenya, (20 1 0) 
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Secondly, Locke in referring to a 'known and impartial judge with authority to settle all 
differences according to the established law' is thinking in the line of resolution of conflict 
between man and man before a judge.43 However in consideration of this topic, an analogy is 
made where the concept of impartial judge applies to a modem day court of law and that 
government also qualifies as 'man' who is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court when 
accused of unjust interference with the 'possessions of another man' (earlier on characterised 
as human rights). 44 
Finally, the idea of 'power to back up and support a correct sentence, and to enforce it 
properly' as per Lockean understanding would mean visiting the requisite punishment on 
criminals after sentencing while being able to contain resistance from them.45 This conception 
can be analogised to the implementation of law by the executive arm of government and 
particularly with regard to the enforcement and protection of human rights after judicial 
determination. For example following a detennination of an existing breach of socio -
economic rights, a court may issue a structural interdict to remedy such breach and in effect 
exercise its power to backup and support a correct sentence, and to enforce it properly.46 
Thus the foregoing explanations demonstrate that government is by and large a product of the 
Social Contract which in light of this topic may be summed as a general acquiescence by the 
public to governance, crystallised in a constitution. Such government derives their just 
powers from the consent of the governed and exists is formed to secure the rights of the 
governed.47 
43 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government', 125 
44 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government' , 4 
45 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government', 134 
46 Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government ', 134 
47 The American Declaration of Independence, In Congress July 4, 1776. 
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2.2. CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Most countries that have a written constitution consider it the most important legal document 
in their legal regime and one by which all other written law must align.48 It is the supreme 
law and has been analogised with a trust agreement.49 The "trustees" in the constitutional 
scheme (the government) are not identical with the "settlor" (the sovereign) and therefore are 
not at liberty to alter the trust agreement and change the limits of their authority. 5° From this 
agreement must come decisions about the extent of authority. 51 
A written constitution is not only a set of rules, it is also a way of creating rules. 52 It is 
therefore more than just a document. It embodies the wishes and aspirations of tl1e country. 
All the laws, by laws, rules s.nd regulations fine! their legitimacy from the constitution. s:l 
Constitutionalism is the idea that a government should not only be sufficiently limited m a 
way that protects its citizens from arbitrary rule but also that such a goverrm1ent should he 
able to operate efficiently and in a way that it can be effectively compelled to govern within 
its constitutional limitations. 54 In other words, constitutionalism combines the idea of a 
government limited in its action and accountable to its citizens for its actions. 55 
Constitutionalism rests on two pillars. First, the existence of certain limitations imposed on 
the state particularly in its relations with citizens, based on certain clearly defmed core 
values. 56 Second, the existence of a clearly defined mechanism for ensuring that the 
48 The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Political and Legal History, Volume 1, Donald T. Critchlow, Philip 
R. VanderMee, 2012, 167 
49 Oxford Encyclopedia of American Political and Legal History, 2012, 167 
50 Oxford Encyclopedia of American Political and Legal History, 2012, 167 
51 Oxford Encyclopedia of American Political and Legal History, 2012, 167 
52 Oxford Encyclopedia of American Political and Legal History, 2012, 167 
53 Maina C, Constitutional Making Process In Tanzania: The Role Of Civil Organisations - 'A Case Study 
prepared for the Civil Society and Govemance in East Africa Project ', 1999, 3 
54 Fombad CM, 'Constitutional Reforms And Constitutionalism In Africa: Reflections On Some Current 
Challenges And Future Prospects ', 2011 , 3 
55 Fombad CM, 'Constitutional Reforms And Constitutionalism In Africa : 2011 , 3 
56 Fombad CM, 'Constitutional Reforms And Constitutionalism In Africa: 2011 , 3 
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limitations on the govemment are legally enforceable. 57 
In this sense, modem constitutionalism has six core elements: 58 
1. the recognition and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms; 
n. the separation of powers; 
111. an independent judiciary; 
IV. the review of the constitutionality oflaws; 
v. the control of the amendment of the constitution; and 
v1. Institutions that support democracy. 59 
For the purposes of this dissertation and the discussion around human rights and their 
enforcement, the first three elements will be considered in the context of the Constitution of 
Kenya. 
2.2.1. The recognition and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms 
Most constitutions have a framework that enshrine fundamental human rights and freedoms 
and which is commonly refened to as a bill of rights . Ideally the optimal protection of human 
rights is to insert a list of human rights guarantees into the constitution.60 This recognition at 
constitutional level ensures that all branches of government are bound by the rights in their 
actions, and that legislation shall respect these rights due to the constitution's hierarchal 
supremacy.61 Furthermore, it. will automatically foster more public supp01i for the human 
rights enumerated in the constitution, if their inclusion is a result of a participatory 
constitutional process and adopted by the people through a national referendum.62 
For example, in the Kenyan legal regime, the Constitution ofKenya at Article 19 reads: 
(1) The Bill of Rights is an integral part of Kenya's democratic state and is the 
framework for social, economic and cultural policies. 
57 Fombad CM, 'Constitutional Reforms And Constitutionalism In Africa: 2011 , 3 
58 Fombad CM, 'Constitutional Reforms And Constitutionalism In Africa: 2011 , 3 
59 Fombad CM, 'Constitutional Refonns And Constitutionalism In Africa: 2011 , 3 
60 The Danish Institute for Human Rights, 'The Constitutional Protection of Human Rights ', 2012, 7 -
https://www.humanrig:hts.dklsites/humanrig:hts.dk/files/media/dokumenter/udgivelser/the constitutional protect 
ion of human rig:hts en.pdfon 18th September, 2017 
61 Danish Institute, 'Constitutional Protection of Human Rights ', 2012, 7 
62 Danish Institute, 'Constitutional Protection of Human Rights' , 2012, 7 
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(2) The purpose of recognising and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is 
to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities and to promote social justice 
and the realisation of the potential of all human beings. 63 
2.2.2. The Separation of Powers 
The doctrine of Separation of Powers deals with the mutual relations among the three organs 
of the Government namely legislature, executive and judiciary. 64 The doctrine means that 
specific functions, duties and responsibilities are allocated to distinctive institutions with a 
defined means of competence and jurisdiction.65 That if one of the three spheres of 
government is responsible for the enactment of rules of law, that body shall not also be 
charged with their execution or with judicial decision about them.66 The same will be said of 
the executive authority, it is not supposed to enact law or to administer justice.67 
In the constitutional theory of John Locke in his Second Treatise of Government He writes 
that: 68 
'It may be too great a temptation to humane frailty apt to grasp at Power, for the same 
Persons who have the Power of making Laws, to have also in their hands the power to 
execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from Obedience to the Laws they make, 
and suit the Law, both in its making and execution, to their own private advantage, and 
thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the Community, contrary to the end of 
Society and Government' 69 
Baron Montesquieu ably expalined this doctrine in the following manner; 
'When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same 
63 Article 19, Constitution of Kenya , (20 1 0) 
64 Tej B Singh, 'Principle of Separation of Powers and Concentration of Authority', Judicial Training and 
Research Institute Journal, Second Year, Issue 4 & 5 March, 1996 
65 Mojapelo J, 'The doctrine of separation of powers (a South African perspective)' General Council of the Bar 
of South Africa, 2013 , 1 - <http://www.sabar.co.za/law-joumals/20 13/apriV20 13-april-vol0?6-no l-pp3746.pdf> 
66 Mojapelo J, 'The doctrine of separation of powers' General Council of the Bar of South Africa, 2013, 1 
67 Mojapelo J, 'The doctrine of separation of powers ' General Council of the Bar of South Africa, 2013 , 1 
68 Mojapelo J, 'The doctrine of separation of powers ' General Council of the Bar of South Africa, 2013 , 1 
69Locke J, 'Second Treatise of Government' , 143 
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body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same 
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. 70 
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and 
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be 
exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the 
executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. 71 
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the 
nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of 
executing the public resolutions, . and of trying the causes of individuals '72 
In the Kenyan case, the constitution of Kenya establishes three distinct arms of government 
and delineates their functions and roles in conformity with this principle. 
Parliament is established under Chapter 8 of the Constitution and it consists of the National 
Assembly and the Senate and has the mandate to make provision having the force of law 
among other functions. 73 
The Executive is also established under article 130 and comprises the President, the Deputy 
President and the rest of the Cabinet and its authority shall be exercised in a manner 
compatible with the principle of service to the people of Kenya, and for their well-being and 
benefit. 74 
The Judiciary is established under article 159 and its authority is derived from the people, 
vests in, and shall be exercised by, the courts and tribunals established by or under the 
Constitution. 75 
The constitution of Kenya envisages an operation of this principle as an inherent component 
of the structure of government. However in the end, courts must determine whether 
unauthorised trespassing by one arm of the state into the tenain of another has occuned. 76 In 
70 Montesquieu B, 'Spirit of The Laws: Of the Laws Which Establish Political Liberty, with Regard to the 
Constitution, Book XI, 1749 
71 Montesquieu, 'Spirit of The Laws: Book XI, 1749 
72 Montesquieu, ' Spirit of The Laws: Book XI, 1749 
73 Article 93&94, Constitution of Kenya, (2010) 
74 Article 129 & 130, Constitution of Kenya, (20 1 0) 
75 Article 159, Constitution of Kenya, (20 1 0) 
76 Moseneke J, 'Separation of Powers, Democratic Ethos and Judicial Function' Oliver Schreiner Memorial 
Lecture, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 23 October 2008, 18 
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that narrow sense, the courts are the ultimate guardians of the Constitution.77 They not only 
have the right to intervene in order to prevent the violation of the Constitution, they also have 
the duty to do so. 78 It is in the performance of this role that courts are more likely to confront 
the question of whether to venture into the domain of other branches of government and the 
extent of such intervention. 79 It is a necessary component of the doctrine of separation of 
powers that courts have a constitutional obligation to ensure that the exercise of power by 
other branches of government occurs within constitutional bounds.80 
But even in these circumstances, courts must observe the limits of their own power. 8 1 
On this basis, the idea of structural interdicts is promoted and enabled by the Kenyan 
government architecture. That in one of the ways the courts may play their role as a defender 
of the constitution is through issuing structural interdicts to remedy the breach of a socio-
economic right. In exercising this duty, a degree independence must be granted to the 
judiciary. 
2.3.4. Judicial Independence 
This is the idea that in the exercise of judicial authority, the Judiciary, as constituted shall be 
subject only to the Constitution and the law and shall not be subject to the control or 
direction of any person or authority.82 The scholar RWM. Dias remarks about it thus: 
The success or failure ofjudicial control of the abuse of power, whatever form such control 
may assume, depends on the judges being independent of those wielding the power. 83 
Independence means far more than immunity from interference; it means that they are 
free to bring their own sense of values to bear in considering legislation and do not simply 
reflect the values of government. 84 For there can be no protection against abuse of power, 
even when safeguards are enshrined in the Constitution, if the judges who have to interpret 
these whenever the government is challenged are only puppets of the government. 85 
This principle was explained in the case of The Queen vs Beauregard (1 986) in which Chief 
Justice Brian Dickson on judicial independence stated that; 
77 Moseneke J, 'Separation of Powers, Democratic Ethos and Judicial Function', 18 
78 Moseneke J, 'Separation ofPowers, Democratic Ethos and Judicial Function' , 18 
79 Moseneke J, 'Separation of Powers, Democratic Ethos and Judicial Function ', 18 
80 Moseneke J, 'Separation ofPowers, Democratic Ethos and Judicial Function ', 18 
81 Moseneke J, 'Separation ofPowers, Democratic Ethos and Judicial Function ', 18 
82 Article 160, Constitution of Kenya, (2010) 
83 Dias, R WM, Jurisprudence London,Butterworths 4th Edition, 1976,128 
84 Dias, RWNI, Jurisprudence London,Butterworths 4th Edition, 1976,128 
85 Dias, RWM, Jurisprudence London,Butterworths 4th Edition, 1976,128. 
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'The role of the courts as resolver of disputes, interpreter of the law and defender of the 
Constitution requires that they be completely separate in authority and fimction from all 
other participants in the justice system. '86 
Under article 160 of the constitution ofKenya, this concept is well articulated and reads; 
'In the exercise ofjudicial authority, the Judiciary, as constituted by Article 161, shall be 
subject only to this Constitution and the law and shall not be subject to the control or 
d . . if h . ,87 zrectwn o any person or aut onty. 
This principle is closely tied with the Separation of powers doctrine. If courts are to have a 
capacity to issue structural interdicts, there must be no interference from government. 
A judiciary of undisputed integrity is the bedrock institution essential for ensuring 
compliance with democracy and the rule of law. 88 Even when all other protections fail, it 
provides a bulwark to the public against encroachments on its rights and freedoms under the 
law.89 
As compared, therefore, to the other organs of govemment, the Judiciary must be well-
anchored upon a foundation that does not flinch at pangs inflicted by the public po\.v·er, nor 
pander to attractions of things allied to such power; that foundation .sits in the stable of low, 
and legality. 90 
Ojwang J gives a rubric upon which the concept ofjudicial independence may be founded; 
1. Firstly, the citizen has to trust that the courts judgement has a finality, and is entitled 
to obedience, as a matter of constitutional obligation. 91 
2. Then the citizen has to trust that the Judiciary shall be guided by rules, principles and 
discretions not influenced by the very power··wielders who cause oppression, or other 
ham1. That is to say, the citizen expects the Judiciary to be independent, in its 
d . . k" 92 ec1s10n-ma mg. 
86 The Queen vs Beauregard (1986), The Supreme Court of Canada, [1986] 2 SCR 56, 30 
87 Article 160, Constitution of Kenya , (20 1 0) 
88 <https://www. judicialintegritygroup.org/ jig-group/jig-historv/78-jig> - accessed on 26 January 2018 
89 <https://www.judicialintegritvgroup.org/ jig-group/jig-historv/78-jig> - accessed on 26 January 2018 
90 Ojwang B, 'The Independence of the Judiciary in Kenya' Conference on the Independence of the Judiciary in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Towards an Independent and Effective Judiciary in Africa, Imperial Resort Beach Hotel, 
Entebbe, June 24-28, 2008 
91 Ojwang B, 'The Independence of the Judiciary in Kenya ' June 24-28, 2008 
92 Ojwang B, 'The Independence of the Judiciary in Kenya ' June 24-28, 2008 
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3. And lastly, the citizen expects the Judiciary to be fair, in its decision-making. 93 
All these attributes underline one theme, independence, as the hallmark of the Judiciary, in a 
constitutional set-up that protects the citizen, as an individual, even as the nations broad 
social goals are pursued by the relevant public agencies, which are driven by a political-cum-
administrative mandate. 94 
2.4. CONCLUSION 
The two foregoing concepts of social contract as a theory and constitutionalism as a 
foundational concept now lay the groundwork for the discussion around the enforcement of 
human rights. When read together, they create the import that government is formed by 
agreement from the governed by way of a constitution and that it will derive its powers fi:om 
that constitution only and not exceed them. That in the exercise of the powers donated to it by 
the constitution, govemment must act in a manner that engenders mutualicy and cooperation 
within it and that the excesses of one ann may be checked by another. With this 
understanding, the question of human rights and their enforcement can then be discussed 
especially when they are asserted against the government. 
93 Ojwang B, 'The Independence of the Judiciary in Kenya' June 24-28 , 2008 
94 Ojwang B, 'The Independence of the Judiciary in Kenya ' June 24-28, 2008 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE STATE AND SOCIO - ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the interplay between the. legal nature of Socia - Economic rights and role of 
government, is considered. A government exrecises its mandate by law and must order its 
business according to the rule of law. Scicio -economic rights which fonn part of human 
rights must then be enshrined in law if they are to gain protection and enforcement from the 
govemment. Thus the legal nature of these rights and the extent to which a govennnent is 
amenable to their protection and fulfiment is discussed. 
3.1. The Character of Socio -Economic Rights 
Socio-economic rights (SERS) are rights that give people access to certain basic needs 
necessary for human beings to lead a dignified life. 95 They concern the basic social and 
economic conditions needed to live a life of dignity and freedom, relating to work and 
workers' rights, social security, health, education, food, water, housing, healthy environment, 
and culture. 96 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) is a key authority in the conceptualisation and implementation of SERs. It is 
arguably the most authoritative document with regard to the conceptualisation of SERs and 
state duty in their implementation. Some of them include but are not limited to: 
The Right to Work and Workers' Rights97 
95 Khoza S, Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa, 2"d Edition, 2007, 20 
96 < https://www.escr-net.org:frights> - On 14 August 2017 
97 Article 6, 7&8, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16 December 1966) 2200A 
(XXI) 
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• The Right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.98 
• The Right to Social Securit/9 
• The Right to an adequate standard of living including adequate food, clothing and 
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. 100 
• The Right to Education which (education) shall be directed to the full development of 
the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 101 
In the context of Kenya and at the national level, the constitution contemplates under Article 
43 the idea of socio-economic rights and describes them thus; 
Economic and Social Rights 
(1) Every person has the right--
a) to the highest attainable standard of health, which includes the right to health care 
services, including reproductive health care; 
b) to accessible and adequate housing, and to reasonable standards of sanitation; 
c) to be free from hunger, and to have adequate food of acceptable quality; 
d) to clean and safe water in adequate quantities; 
e) to social security; and 
f) to education. 102 
98 Article 12, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
99 Article 9, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
100 Article 11 , International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
10 1 Article 13, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
102 Article 43 , Constitution ofKenya (2010) 
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3.1.2 The Justiciability of Socio-Economic Rights. 
Black's Law dictionary defines justiciability as 'capacity to claim a right before a tribunal. ' 103 
It is the ability to judicially determine whether or not a person's right has been violated or 
whether the state has failed to meet a constitutionally recognized obligation to respect, 
protect, or fulfill a person's right. 104 It would then, broadly speaking, be the extent to which a 
matter is suitable for judicial determination. 105 Enshrining rights in the bill of rights makes 
them amenable to judicial interpretation and enforcement. 
Justiciability of socio-economic rights has been said to consist m two dimensions; the 
legitimacy dimension and the institutional competence dimension. 106 The legitimacy 
dimension refers to the nature, or character, of socio - economic rights and asks whether it 
would be legitimate to confer constitutional status on socio - economic rights in light of their 
subject matter. 107 The institutional competence dimension of justiciability looks more to the 
nature, or character, of the judiciary, and addresses whether the judiciary possesses the 
institutional capacity and competence to adjudicate social rights. 108 
Most criticisms and arguments against inclusion of socio- economic rights in a constitution 
centre around institutional competence. They advance the conception that socio-economic 
rights require governmental action, are resource-intensive thus expensive to protect; 
progressive and therefore requiring time to realize; vague in terms of the obligations they 
mandate; and invoiving complex, polycentric, and diffuse interests in collective goods. 109 A 
clear example was the debate concerning introduction of socio-economic rights in the South 
103 <https://thelawdictionarv.om/justiciabilitv/>- accessed on 30 January 2018 
104 Scott C and Macklem P, 'Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a new 
South African Constitution ', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, November 1992, 17 
105 Scott C and Macklem P, 'Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? , 17 
106 Scott C and Macklem P, 'Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees?, 20 
107 Scott C and Macklem P, 'Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees?, 21 
108 Scott C and Macklem P, 'Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees?, 21 
109 Scott C and Macklem P, 'Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees?, 24 
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African Constitution. Those against their inclusion argued that it would be equally erosive to 
the legitimacy of the Constitution if it promised too much and since rights impose 
corresponding duties, the constitution would lose its credibility if it told people they have 
rights in respect of which the state cannot deliver, due to a lack of resources. 110 The 
Constitutional Court of South Africa however weighed in on this matter and asserted that; 
It is true that the inclusion of socio-economic rights may result in courts making orders 
which have direct implications for budgetary matters. However, even when a court enforces 
civil and political rights, such as equality, freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial, the 
order it makes will often have such implications. In our view it cannot be said that by 
including socio-economic rights within a bill of rights, a task is conferred upon courts so 
dijferent from that ordinarily conferred upon them by a bill of rights that it results in a 
breach of the separation of powers. 111 
With regmd to justiciability of socio-economic 1ights, the court further opined that; 
These righzs are, at leasi to some extent, justiciable. The fact that socio-economic rights will 
almost inevitably give rise to such (budgetary) implications does not seem to us to be a bar to 
their justiciability. At the very minimum, socio--economic rights can be negative(y protected 
from improper invasion. 112 
Notably, these . rights continue to enJOY constitutional guarantee in most progres:-:1ve 
jurisdictions. In Kenya, the Court of Appeal examined the justiciability of these rights in 
Kenya AiqJorts Authority v Nfitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR and 
rendered itself thus; 
'To continue to afford socio-economic rights less judicial protection and enforcement is 
erroneous because by their ve1y nature socio-economic rights are crucial to a state's 
development; they cannot be mere "aspirations" and must be afforded the protection they 
rightly deserve. '113 
110 HeynS C, 'Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution' 1998, 3 
111 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744; 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC), para. 77. 
112 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Af1ica 1996 Constitutional Court, para 78 
11 3 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [20 16] eKLR, para 34 
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In light of this justiciable status of these 1ights and their positive nature, the role and 
obligation of the state in their respect, protection and fulfilment is discussed below. 
3.2. State Obligation And Socio-Economic Rights 
To Respect, Protect and Fulfil 
The rule of law has played an integral part in anchoring economic, social and cultural rights 
in national constitutions, laws and regulations. 114 Where such rights are justiciable or their 
legal protection is otherwise ensured, the rule of law provides the means of redress when 
those 1ights are not upheld or public resources are misused. 115 The preamble to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights anticipates this very important concept when it conceptualises 
it in the following words; 
'Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to 
rebellion ag2-inst tynumy and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the 
rule of law' .116 
Karel Vasak explains the legal nature of human rights and legal reality which must foster 
their enjoyment. He states that in order for human rights to become a legal reality; three 
requirements must be met: 
an organized society must exist in the form of a de jure State; 117 
o within the State human rights must be exercised in a pre-established legal framework, 
which may neve1iheless vary according to circumstances and according to the nature 
of the rights; 118 
114 <https: //www.un.org/ruleoflaw/rule-of-law-and-human-rights/> on 21 September 2017 
115 <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/rule-of-law-and-human-rights/> on 21 September 2017 
11 6 Preamble, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948 
11 7 Vasak K, The International Dimensions Of Human Rights, Greenwood Press Westport, Connecticut, 1982, 4 
11 8 Vasak K., The International Dimensions Of Human Rights, 4 
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«~ those entitled to exercise human rights must be provided with specific legal 
guarantees and, in particular, recourse must be provided so as to ensure that those 
rights are respected. 119 
Through ratification of international human rights treaties, states undertake to put into place 
domestic measures and legislation compatible with their treaty obligations and duties under 
international law to respect, to protect and to fulfil human rights.120 
.This international typology was for instance asserted in the case of SERAC vs Nigeria (2001) 
in which the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights rendered itself thus; 
Internationally accepted ideas of the various obligations engendered by human rights 
indicate that all rights - civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural -
generate at least four levels of duties for a State that undertakes to adhere to a rights regime, 
namely the duty to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil these rights. These obligations 
universally apply to all rights and entail a combination of negative and positive duties . . n 1 
The constitution of Kenya captures the nature and extent of these obligations unde!· Article 
21(1) and (4) ; 
I. It is a fundamental duty of the State and every State organ to observe, tcspe<:t, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of 
Rights 122 
Sub - article 4 reads 
1. The State shall enact and implement legislation to fulfil its international obligations in 
respect ofhuman rights and fundamental freedoms. 123 
For the purposes of this discussion and with regard to the nature and character of SERs, this 
paper will focus on the obligations of respecting, protecting and fulfilling SERs. 
3.2.1. The Obligation to Respect 
The obligation to respect means that States must refrain from interfering with or curtailing the 
11 9 Vasak K, T11e International Dimensions Of Human Rights, 4 
120 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages!InternationalLaw.aspx>- accessed on 30 January 201 8 
121 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERA C) and Another v Nigeria (200 1) ACmHPR Comm. 2001 , 
para 44. 
122 Article 2 1, Constitution of Kenya (20 1 0) 
123 Article 21 , Constitution of Kenya (2010) 
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enjoyment of human rights. 124 The African Commission defined the obligation to respect 
human rights as, requiring the State to refrain from interfering with the existing fundamental 
rights of rights-holders; to respect the right-holders autonomy, freedom and resources; as well 
as the liberty of their actions in using the resources available to them individually and 
collectively in the realisation of their fundamental rights .125For example under the right to 
housing, the state must refrain from instituting unlawful evictions unless the required 
procedural guarantees are met. 
In the case of Ibrahim Sangor Osman v Minister of State for Provincial Administration & 
Internal Security & 3 Others (2011) eKLR, an application was brought by a group of 1,122 
people who had been forcefully evicted from an un-alienated public land that they had been 
occupying since the 1940s. The Petitioners approached the Court citing a violation of both 
civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights contained in the 
Constitution of Kenyan 2010, especially the right to life under Article 26(1) and (3), the right 
to human dignity under Article 28 and 29, the right to information under Article 35(1), the 
right to property under Article 40, the right to housing, food, water and health as contained in 
Article 43(1) as well as the right to fair administrative action under Article 47.253 They 
sought a permanent injunction restraining the Respondents from evicting them in future, a 
mandatory injunction ordering the Respondents to provide them with suitable and pennanent 
altemative land, shelter or accommodation, and an order for general, aggravated and 
exemplary damages. The Court then provided substantive remedies as requested by the 
Petitioners, ordering the Respondents by a mandatory injunction to retum the Petitioners to 
the land from which they were evicted, to reconstruct for them reasonable residences or 
houses with all the requisite social amenities to be mutually agreed upon by all the parties, a 
permanent injunction restraining the respondents from forcefully evicting the 
Petitioners in future as well as damages of Kshs. 200,000 for each of the 1,122 
Petitioners. 126 
3.2.2. The Obligation to Protect 
The obligation to protect requires States to protect individuals and groups against human 
124 http ://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professiona!Interest/Pages/IntemationalLaw.aspx On 15 August 2017 
125 SERAC case para 45 
126 Ibrahim Sangor Osman v Minister of State for Provincial Administration & Internal Security & 3 Others 
(2011) eKLR, 
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rights abuses. 127 This obligation entails the responsibility of the State to protect right-holders 
against political, economic, and social interferences of their rights by third parties which lead 
to the violation or threats of violation of their fundamental rights. 128 The State is thus under a 
duty to put in place effective legislative, policy, administrative and regulatory structures to 
ensure that third parties do not violate the rights of right-holders, and further requires the 
State to put in place effective judicial and other remedial measures for the vindication of 
rights in instances ofviolation. 129 
Its obligations to protect obliges it to prevent the violation of any individual's right to 
housing by any other individual or non-state actors like landlords, property developers, and 
landowners, and where such infringements occur, it should act to preclude further deprivation 
as well as guarantee access to legal remedies. 130A clear example is where the government of 
Kenya passed the Rent Restriction Act which makes provision for restric.ting the increase of 
rent, the right to possession and the exaction of premiums, and for fixing standard rents, in 
relation to dwelling-houses. 131 Also there is sufficient judicial installation through which 
legal redress for the violation of this right may be sought for example through the High 
Court. 
In the case of Susan Waithera Kariuki & 4 others v Town Clerk, Nairobi City Council & 2 
others there was a threatened demolition of houses and eviction of the Applicants from their 
homes, which were in informal settlements, on the ground that the houses were built on road 
reserves. The court emphasised the requirement that the Constitution is to be interpreted in a 
manner that promotes its purposes, values and principles as well as advance the rule of law, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as is enshrined in Article 259(1) of the Constitution. 
The Court thus held that Applicants' right to housing overrode the First Respondent's duty to 
plan the City, and that it was unconstitutional to forcefully evict the Applicants from the 
houses they had occupied for over forty years with the consequence that they are rendered 
homeless. It further called on the State to expeditiously put in place the requisite 
legislative, policy and programmatic framework which sufficiently catered for the 
short-, medium- and long-term housing needs of everyone, but that responded to the 
special needs of the most vulnerable and marginalised people living in crisis situations, such 
127
- http://www.ohchr.ondEN/Professiona!Interest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx On 15 August 2017 
128 SERAC case para 46 
129 The East African Centre for Human Rights, A compendium on economic and social rights cases under the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010, 2015, 18 
130 SERAC case para 61 
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as the applicants. 
3.2.3. The Obligation to Fulfil 
The obligation to fulfil means that States must take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment 
of basic human rights. 132In fulfilling SERs rights, the state must endeavour to provide and 
actively ensure the sustained existence of the necessary means through which they may be 
enjoyed by all citizens without discrimination. 133 One way this may be done is through 
providing direct subsidies or assistance when the poor are not able to obtain essential services 
d k . 134 or goo sat mar et pnces. 
In Kenya for example the government announced Sh 6 billion maize subsidy to lower the 
cost of flour to Sh90 for a two-kilo gramme packet and easy inflationary pressure. 135 Also in 
fulfilling the right to education which is a socio-economic right under the constitution of 
Kenya, the state has built many schools and institutions of learning from primary to tertiary 
education. For example in 2014 the government of Kenya announced it would build technical 
training institutes in every constih1ency in the next five years in a bid to solve the shortage of 
skilled personnel in technical fields such as artisans, technologists, technicians and other 
technical expertise and to stimulate economic competitiveness and alleviate poverty. 136 
3.2.5. Progressive Realization 
Given the resource and knowledge restraints faced by many countries, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights recognizes the fulfillment of economic 
and social rights can only be achieved over time, and calls for the progressive realization of 
ESCR.137 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR reads; 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum 
132 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/Intemationa1Law.aspx> On 15 August 2017 
133 Khoza S, Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa, 2"d Edition, 2007, 36 
134 <https: //www.escr-net.org/resources/ob1igation-fulfill>- accessed on 31 January 2018 
135 <https:/ /www. businessdailva frica. corn/news/State-sets-price-of-maize-flour -at -S h90-a-pac ket- in -subsidy-
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of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption oflegislative measures. 138 
This term 'progressive realization' IS giVen mearung m the context of SERs by the 
Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in its General Comment on 
The Nature of States Parties' Obligations. The ICESCR anticipates that states will take 
'active steps' in the realization of the rights contained in it. The general comment succinctly 
describes what these steps entail; 
' . .. Thus while the full realization of the relevant rights may be achieved progressively, steps 
towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably short time after the Covenant 's entry 
into force for the States concerned. Such steps should be deliberate, concrete and targeted as 
clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant. 139 
While there may be difficulty in coming up with an all-inclusive and overarching definition 
of the term 'progressive realization', the general comment goes ahead to give a clear 
understanding of the concept under paragraph _9 where it reads; 
' ... The concept of progressive realization constitutes a recognition of the fact that fit!! 
realization of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally not be able to be 
achieved in a short period of time... 'Nevertheless, the fact that realization over time, or in 
other words progressively, is foreseen under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as 
depriving the obligation of all meaning/it! content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility 
device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for any country in 
ensuring fitll realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, the 
phrase must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d'etre, of the 
Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States parties in respect of the fit!! 
realization of the rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously 
and effectively as possible towards that goal. Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive 
measures in that regard would require the most carefitl consideration and would need to be 
fitlly justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the 
138 Article 2(1), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966 
139 CESCR General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the 
Covenant) , 14 December 1990, 2 
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context of the full use of the maximum available resources.' 140 
In the case of Centre For Rights Education & Awareness(creaw) & 8 others v Attorney 
General & another [2012} eKLR, the High Court ofKenya explained that 'the Constitution is 
thus very clear on what rights are subject to the progressive realisation test-the social and 
economic rights to health care, education, water, housing, and sanitation. 141 Such rights 
require the allocation of resources, and as is the case with similar provisions in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the state's obligation is 
made subject to the availability of resources .' 142 
3.3. CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing explanations, it is clear that the state has obligations of respect, protection 
and fulfilment of rights towards its citizens. If it breaches these duties and the citizens are 
incapable of enjoying these rights as they should, the judiciary will so determine such breach 
and mandate the government to remedy such breach as the following case demonstrates; 
Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International 
on behalf of Endoruis Welfare Council v Kenya (2003/ 43 
ln tlils case, the complainants (Endorois community) alleged that the Government of Kenya 
in violation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples" Rights, the Constitution of Kenya 
and international law, forcibly removed them from their ancestral lands around the Lake 
Bogoria area of the Baringo and Koibatek Administrative Districts, as well as in the Nakuru 
and Laikipia Administrative Districts within the Rift Valley Province in Kenya, without 
proper prior consultations, adequate and effective compensation. 144 
The Respondent (Government of Kenya) argued that following the Declaration of the Lake 
Bogoria Game Reserve, the Government embarked on a re-settlement exercise, culminating 
in the resettlement of the majority of the Endorois in the Mochongoi settlement scheme. It 
argued that this was over and above the compensation paid to the Endorois after their 
14° CESCR General Comment 3, 9 
141 Centre For Rights Education & Awareness(creaw) & 8 others v Attorney General & another [2012] eKLR 
Para 49 
142 Centre For Rights Education & Awareness(creaw) & 8 others v Attorney General & another [2012] eKLR 
Para 49 
143 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya (2003) ACrnHPR Comm. 
144 Endorois case, Para 2 
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ancestral land around Lake was gazetted. 145 
It was decided that the Respondents (Government of Kenya) bears the burden for creating 
conditions favourable to a people's development and that it was not the responsibility of 
the Endorois themselves to fmd alternate places to graze their cattle or partake in religious 
ceremonies. The government was obligated to ensure that the Endorois are not left out of the 
development process or bene±l.ts. The African Commission contended that the failure to 
provide adequate compensation and benefits, or provide suitable land for grazing indicated 
that the government did not adequately provide for the Endorois in the development process. 
It found against the government that the Endorois community has suffered a violation of 
Article 22 of the Charter. 146 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE CASE FOR THE STRUCTURAL INTERDICTS IN KENYA · 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter an indepth analysis of both local and international jurisprudence ·around · 
structural interdicts is done. The concept of 'transformative constitutions' comes out as a key 
pillar upon which the very validity and necessity of structural interdicts tums. Further, an 
analysis of the Mitu - Bell case is done (which case is arguably the most influential and 
significant case on structural interdicts in Kenyan law). The considerations of the appellate 
court in nullifying the judgement of the High Court are analysed and countered, with the 
aggregate of the counter arguments consisting the case for structural interdicts in Kenya. 
The nature of Structural Interdicts 
A structural interdict is a judicial remedy that demands the violator to rectify the breach of · 
fundamental rights under court supervision. 147 It normally provides an on-going supervision 
and requires compliance with constitutional provisions and mandates. 148 It works such that 
the government reports back to the court at regular intervals about the steps they have taken 
to comply with the orders given. 149 Because of its nature, it can be used both as relief for 
those whose rights have been violated and as a remedy to deter violations of a similar nature 
145 Endorois case, Para 142 
146 Endorois case, Para 298 
147 Currie & de Waal, Remedies in The Bill OfRights Handbook, 219 
148 Mutakha K, 'Remedies In Constitutional Litigation Under The Kenyan Constitution Of 201 0' 
149 Mitra Ebadolahi, "Using Structural Interdicts and the south African Human Rights Commission to Achieve 
Judicial Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights in South Africa," The New York University Law Review, 
VoL 83 (2008) , p. 1565. 
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in future. 150 
lain Currie & Johan de Waal suggest the five characteristics that make up Structural 
Interdicts which include; 151 
1. Issuance of a declaration by the Court identifying how the government has infringed 
an individual or group's constitutional rights or otherwise failed to comply with its 
constitutional obligations. 152 
2. The court mandates government compliance with constitutional responsibilities. 153 
3. The government is ordered to prepare and submit a comprehensive report, usually 
under oath, to the court on a preset date. This report, which should explicate the 
government's action plan for remedying the challenged violations, gives "the 
responsible state agency, the opportunity to choose the means of compliance" with the 
constitutional rights in question, rather than the court itself developing or dictating a 
solution. 154 
4. Once the required report is presented, the court evaluates whether the proposed plan 
in fact remedies the constitutional infringement and whether it brings the government 
into compliance with its constitutional obligations. 155 This stage of a structural 
interdict may involve multiple government presentations depending on how the 
litigants respond to the proposed plan and, more significantly, whether the court finds 
the plan to be constitutionally sound. After court approval, a fmal order (integrating 
the government plan and any court-ordered amendments) is issued. 156 
4.1. The South African approach to Structural Interdicts 
In the South African legal regime, the structural interdict was first recognised as a legal and 
valid remedy in the case of Pretoria City Council vs Walker (1998)_in which it was held that 
litigants seeking either a declaratory or mandatory order to vindicate a constitutional right 
could also obtain a court order that the sphere of government in question take 
appropriate steps as soon as possible to eliminate the violation of rights and to report 
150 Mbazira, Litigating Socio-Economic Rights In South Africa, 166. 
151 Currie & de Waal, Remedies in The Bill OfRights Handbook, 219 
152 Currie & de Waal, Remedies in The Bill OfRights Handbook, 219 
153 Currie & de Waal , Remedies in The Bill Of Rights Handbook, 219 
154 Currie & de Waal, Remedies in The Bill OfRights Handbook, 219 
155 Currie & de Waal, Remedies in The Bill OfRights Handbook, 219 
156 Currie & de Waal, Remedies in The Bill Of Rights Handbook, 219 
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back to the court in question. 157 (emphasis mine) 
This remedy continues to enjoy a robust existence and usage in South Africa with one of the 
most prominent examples being in The Nkandla Judgement. 158 
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic 
Alliance vs Speaker of the National Assembly and Others case[2016} ZACC 11 (The Nkandla 
Judgement). 
Facts 
Several South Africans, lodged complaints with the Public Protector concerning aspects of 
the security upgrades that were being effected at the President's Nkandla private residence. 159 
The Public Protector anived at the conclusion that the President and his family were unduly 
enriched as a result of the non-security features , and took remedial action against him in 
tenns of section 182(1)(c) ofthe Constitution. 160 
The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) launched an application to court, and in effect asked 
for an order affirming the legally binding effect of the Public Protector's remedial action; 
directing the President to comply with the Public Protector's remedial action; and declming 
that both the President and the National Assembly acted in breach of their constitutional 
obligations. 
The Court held that the findings and remedial actions taken by the Public Protector were 
binding unless set aside by a judicial order and that the National Assembly flouted its 
obligations by passing a resolution that purported effectively to nullify the findings made and 
remedial action taken by the Public Protector. 161 
157<http://www.polity.org.za/article/the-nature-and-role-of-the-structural-interdict-supervisory-order-its-use-
and-appropriateness-as-a-remedv-in-the-nkandla-judgment-20 16-04-11>- accessed on 31 January 2018 
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The court further issued orders in the nature of a Structural Interdict which included: 162 
7. The National Treasury must report back to this Court on the outcome of its 
determination within 60 days of the date of this order. 
8. The President must personally pay the amount determined by the National Treasury in 
terms of paragraphs 5 and 6 above within 45 days of this Court's signification of its 
approval of the report 
The result was that the President had to comply with the orders of court and had to effect 
them promptly within the stipulated time under the supervision of the court. 
4.2._The Kenyan Approach to Structural Interdicts 
In Kenya both the High Court and the Supreme Court have previously issued orders in the 
-
nature of a structural interdict in what may be referred to as 'making jurisprudential 
strides' .163 For example the Supreme Court in Communications Commission Of Kenya & 5 
Others v Royal Afedia Services Limited & 5 Others (2014) eKLR issued orders in the nature 
of a structural interdict. In this case, The CCK had shut down six radio stations and Citizen 
TV services belonging to Royal Media Services in some parts of the country claiming the 
media house was using unauthorised or 'grabbed' frequencies. Royal Media Services on the 
other hand claimed that the move was politically motivated and had no legal basis . The case 
went all the way to the Supreme Court and in its decision, the court issued a structural 
interdict against the CCK crystallised in orders which read; 164 
1. The 1st Appellant shall, in exercise of its statutory powers,and within 90 days of the 
date hereof; consider the merits of applications for a BSD licence by the 1st, 2nd 
and 3rd respondents, and of any other local private sector actors in the broadcast 
industry, whether singularly or jointly. 
162 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others, 2016 para 105 
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2. The I st appellant (CAK) shall, in exercise of its statutory powers, ensure that the 
BSD licence issued to the 5th appellant herein, is duly aligned to constitutional and 
statutory imperatives. 
3. The 1st appellant (CAK), in exercise of its statutory authority, shall, in consultation 
with all the parties to this suit, set the time-lines for the digital migration, pending the 
international Analogue Switch-off Date of 17th June, 2015. 
4. Upon the course of action directed in the foregoing Orders (d & e) being concluded, 
the 1st appellant (CAK) shall notify the Court through the Registry; and the 
Registrar shall schedule this matter for mention, on the basis of priorityJ before a 
full Bench. 
Also the High Court has in previous instances issued a structural interdict like in Satrose 
A yuma & 11th Others v The Registered Trustees of the Kenya Railways Staff Retirement 
Pension Scheme & 2 others. Nairobi HC Petition No. 65 of (2010) eKLR. In this case the 
petitioners had been evicted from the land they lived on which was claimed by the 
respondents as belonging to them. The petitioners claimed various violations of fundamental 
rights and freedoms including the right to accessible and adequate housing among others. In 
finding for the petitioners, Lenaola, J. issued a structural interdict contained in orders which 
read in part: 165 
c) The 3rd Respondent shall within 90 days of this Judgment file an Affidavit in this 
Court detailing out existing or planned State Policies and Legal Framework on Forced 
Evictions and Demolitions in Kenya generally and whether they are in line with acceptable 
International standards. 
d) The 3rd Respondent shall within 90 days of this Judgment file an Affidavit in this 
Court detailing out the measures the Government has put in place towards the realisation of · 
the right to accessible and adequate housing and to reasonable sanitation in Kenya as is the 
165 Satrose Ayuma v The Registered Trustees of the Kenya Railways Staff Retirement Pension Scheme (2010) 
para 111 
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expectation of Article 43(1) (b) of the Constitution. 
e) Within 21 days of this Judgment, a meeting shall be convened by the Managing Trustee 
of the 1st Respondent together with the Petitioners, where a programme of eviction of the 
Petitioners shall be designed taking into account all the factors clearly outlined (emphasis 
supplied) 
These are just some of the instances in which there was an application of structural interdicts 
in the Kenyan.legal scene. However the case of lvfitu-Bell Welfare Society v Attorney General 
& 2 others [2013} eKLR stands out as arguably the most prominent case with regard to 
structural interdicts in Kenya partly because of an elaborate appeal judgement which entirely 
nipped in the bud the growing usage of structural interdicts in Kenya and partly because of 
the wide debate it spurred in legal and academic circles. The case is discussed below in both 
its original and appeal instances. 
4.2.1. Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Attorney General & 2 others[2013} 
eKLR 
The petitioner was a society registered under the provisions of the Societies Act, Cap 108 
Laws of Kenya and comprised residents of Mitumba Village which held some 3065 
households or approximately 15, 325 men, women and children. They were evicted from the 
land they lived on by the respondents who claimed among other things that it was their land 
and further that the continued existence of the petitioners in the suit land was posing a 
security risk as they were on flight paths. Mumbi J in finding for the petitioners stated that the 
actions of the respondents in demolishing the village resulted in a violation of the rights of 
the petitioners under the Constitution. She then issued a structural interdict consisting in the 
following orders:166 
i) That the respondents do provide, by way of affidavit, within 60 days of today, the current 
state policies and programmes on provision of shelter and access to housing for the 
marginalised groups such as residents of informal and slum settlements. 
166 Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v Attorney General & 2 others[2013] eKLR 
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iii) That the respondents do engage with the petitioners, Pamoja Trust, other relevant state 
agencies and civil society organizations with a view to identifying an appropriate resolution 
to the petitioners 'grievances following their eviction from Mitumba Village. 
iv) That the parties report back on the progress made towards a resolution of the 
petitioners' grievances within 90 days from today. 
4.2.2. The Appeal: Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others 
[2016] eKLR 
The Court of Appeal found for the appellants and proceeded to set aside the ruling of the 
High Court. It revisited the facts of the case and among other considerations, concluded that 
the trial judge had erred on various points of fact and law. 
It then addressed itself to the question of the structural interdict as a constitutional remedy to 
the violation of constitutional rights in Kenyan law. It categorically and totally rejected the 
structural interdict in Kenyan law citing the following reasons: 
0 - -
1. A judgment brings to an end the jurisdiction of the court that delivers the same and 
that there is no provision under the Civil Procedure Act or Rules for partial 
judgments or reserving powers to receive additional pleadings. 167 It espoused the 
view that the concept of partial judgment or interim judgment which allows parties to 
file affidavits and reports (conditions under which structural interdicts exist) after 
hearing ofthe parties is unknown to the Kenyan law. 168 
2. The nature of the orders given allowed for third parties to engage in identifying an 
appropriate resolution to the petitioners' grievances as had been previously done with 
legal basis being Article 23 (3) of the Constitution that allows the court to grant 
appropriate relief. This amounts to an abdication of judicial function and an 
unauthorized reliance by judges on non- judges. 169 The court cited the Telkom Kenya 
Ltd. -vs- John Ochwada( 2014) eKLR case in which the court expressed itself as 
follows: 
"It would be a serious abdication of the judicial function was the same to be 
delegated to the parties who come to the courts for that very determination. Such 
167 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR para 68 
168 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR para 71 
169 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR para 77 
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delegation is a nullity for all purposes and the challenge to the learned judge 's ruling 
on that score is well-founded and upheld." 170 
3. Article 23 (3) of the Kenya Constitution that permits the High Court to grant an 
appropriate relief should not be construed to be provision that permits the High 
Court to borrow legislations from other countries and through judicial 
interpretation embed them into the laws of Kenya. 171 That there had been over 
reliance on foreign jurisprudence without taking into account the circumstances under 
which that interpretation of law was reached. 
4.3. Analysis of Mitu-Bell and Arguments for Structural Interdicts in Kenya. 
The decision by the Court of Appeal has attracted wide debate and sparked discussion around 
the viability of structural interdicts. It has been claimed that the court in this decision 
rubbished jurisprudence that is critical in the realisation of constitutional aspirations hitherto 
developed by the High Court. 172 Since the decision has not been appealed, the effect is that 
the Court of Appeal has capped the use of the innovative remedy of Structural Interdicts in 
Kenya up until the court itself or the Supreme Court shall depart from that jurisprudence in 
the absence of a referendum that substantially changes the provisions of Article 23 of the 
Constitution ofKenya. 
Nonetheless, a case for Structural Interdicts in Kenya is made below and is contained under 
various heads of argument; 
4.3.1. The authority of Legislation (Civil Procedure Act and Rules) vis a 
vis The Constitution of Kenya 
17° Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [201 6] eKLR para 76 
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The court argued that Section 25 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that the court, after the 
case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment, and on such judgment a decree shall follow. 
Under Order 21 Rule 7 (1) the decree shall agree with the judgment. 173 The court further 
defined judgement as the final court order regarding the rights and liabilities of the parties 
that reso I ves all the contested issues and terminates the law suit. 174 It is the court's final 
and official pronouncement of the law on action that was pending before it. 175 A judgment 
has the effect of terminating the jurisdiction of the court that delivered the judgment. 176 In the 
court's view, delivery of a judgement renders a court functus officio under Kenyan law. 
The trial court however issued an interdict on the legal basis of Article 23 (3) of the 
Constitution of Kenya which confers power to a court to grant appropriate relief including 
declarations of rights, injunctions, conservatory orders, and compensation. Article 23(3) 
reads· 177 , 
In any proceedings brought under Article 22, a court may grant appropriate relief, 
including-
a) a deClaration of rights; 
b) an injunction; 
c) a conservatory order; 
d) a declaration of invalidity of any law that denies, violates, infringes, or threatens a 
right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights and is not justified under Article 
24; 
e) an order for compensation; and 
f) an order of judicial review. 
While the constitution does not expressly provide for structural interdicts, jurisprudence 
surrounding the question of appropriate relief in protecting SERs is clear that the structural 
interdict is one such relief. In the South African case of Fose v Minister of Safety and 
Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) the court in considering appropriate reliefs rendered itself 
thus; 
'Appropriate relief will in essence be relief that is required to protect and enforce the 
173 Order 21, Rule 7(1) Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 
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Constitution. Depending on the circumstances of each particular case the relief may be a 
declaration of rights, an interdict, a mandamus or such other relief as may be required to 
ensure that the rights enshrined in the Constitution are protected and enforced. '178 
Up until this point, this was the position taken by High Court in the cases of Satrose Ayuma 
(discussed above) and Kepha Omondi Onjuro & others v Attorney General & 5 others, 
Nairobi HCC Petition No. 239 of 2014, where Odunga, J. issued among others orders and 
directions that eviction of the petitioners in the suit shall be undertaken inter alia with full 
participation of stakeholders and Commissioners from the Kenya National Commission on 
Human Rights Commission. The respondents were to file quarterly reports in court on the 
progress of the project until further orders of the court; that each party shall have liberty to 
apply.J79 
The Court of Appeal departed from this transformative jurisprudence flowing from Article 23 
and gave prominence to the Civil Procedure Act and Rules. The effect is then that statutory 
provisions override constitutional provision and this flies directly in the face of constitutional 
supremacy as anticipated under Article 2(4) of the Constitution of Kenya; --- -
(3) Any law, including customary law, that is inconsistent with this Constitution is void to 
the extent of the inconsistency, and any act or omission in contravention of this 
Constitution is invalid. 180 
A power play thus emerges between statutory and constitutional interpretation but which was 
succinctly addressed in the case of Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 
(1995) 4 SA 631 (CC) where Fronenman J rendered himself thus: 
"The interpretation of the Constitution will be directed at ascertaining the foundational 
values inherent in the Constitution, whilst the interpretation of the particular legislation will 
be directed at ascertaining whether that legislation is capable of an interpretation which 
conforms with the fundamental values or principles of the Constitution. "181 
178 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para 19 
179 Kepha Omondi Onjuro & others v Attorney General & 5 others, Nairobi HCC Petition No. 239 of (20 14) 
eKLR, para 150 
180 Article 2(4) , Constitution of Kenya 2010 
181 Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison (1995) 4 SA 631 (CC) 
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Article 259 of the Constitution of Kenya states that; 182 
This Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that-
a) promotes its purposes, values and principles; 
b) advances the rule of law, and the human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
Bill of Rights; 
c) permits the development of the law; and 
d) contributes to good governance. 
The values and principles of the constitution are anticipated under article 1 0; 
The national values and principles of governance include --
a) patriotism, national unity, sharing and devolution of power, the rule of law, 
democracy and participation of the people; 
b) human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, equality, human rights, non-
discrimination and protection of the marginalised; 
c) good governance, integrity, transparency and accountability; and 
d) sustainable development. 
On these grounds, a court has mandate to develop appropriate relief in instances of breach of 
rights contained in the bill of rights. Human dignity, social justice, human rights and public 
participation are per se sufficient to warrant issuance of structural interdicts if they are the 
most appropriate relief in the circumstances. In spite of this glaring fact, the Court of Appeal 
chose to sacrifice this progressive approach to constitutional interpretation and sacrificed it at 
the altar of statutory rigidity and talismanic formalism. The supremacy of the constitution 
over statute is not in question. For example in the case of Samuel G. Momanyi v Attorney 
General & another (2012) eKLR, the comi issued an order ' declaring Section 45(3) of the 
Employment Act 2007 invalid by reason of its violation of the rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the Bill of Rights of the Petitioner rights and fundamental freedoms. ' 183 
On this basis, the Court of Appeal erred in declaring statutory provisions to be inherently 
supreme as to overwhelm the spirit, values and principles of a transformative constitution. In 
Njoya & Others vs. Attorney General and Others [2004} 1 KLR 232 Ringera, J (as he then 
was) held at paragraph 18 that: 
182 Article 259(1), Constitution ofKenya 2010 
183 Samuel G. Momanyi v Attorney General & another (2012) eKLR 
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"]shall accordingly approach constitutional interpretation in this case on the premise that 
the Constitution is not an Act of Parliament and is not to be interpreted as one. It is the 
supreme law of the land; it is a living instrument with a soul and a consciousness; it 
embodies certain fundamental values and principles and must be construed broadly, 
liberally and purposely or teleologically to give effect to those values and principles; and 
that whenever the consistency of any provision(s) of an Act of Parliament with the 
Constitution are called into question, the court must seek to find whether those provisions 
meet the values and principles embodied in the Constitution. "184 
4.3.2. Structural Interdicts amount to an Abdication of Judicial 
Functions 
The court held the view that trial court erred in law and abdicated its role by delegating 
judicial functions and powers to "Pamoja Trust" and other unnamed state agencies and civil 
society organizations with a view to identifying an appropriate resolution to the petitioner's 
grievances following their eviction from Mitumba village. 185 In so doing it stated that 'it is 
fundamental to the independence, impartiality and integrity of the judiciary for a judge to ---
exercise the powers of office without undue or unauthorized reliance upon non-judges.' 186 It 
affirmed the dicta in the Telkom case 187 while relying on the case of R -vs- Governor of 
Brixton Prison, ex parte Enahoro (1963) 2 QB where it was expressed that; 
"it is well settled that certainly no person made responsible for a judicial decision can 
delegate his responsibility. " 
As per the trial court, the legal basis for involving third parties is Article 23 (3) of the 
Constitution that allows the court to grant appropriate relief. In the Satrose Ayuma case, 
(discussed above) it was stated that the legal basis for stakeholder involvement is Articles 9 
and 10 of the Constitution on public participation. 
In considering Articles 9, 10 and 23 (3) of the Constitution as read with the jurisdictional 
mandate and functions of the comi as provided for in Article 159 (1) of the Constitution, the 
Court of Appeal asserted that the concept of public participation and the provisions of Article 
23(3) that allow the High Court to come up with an appropriate relief do not authorize 
184 Njoya & Others vs. Attorney General and Others [2004] 1 KLR 232, para 18 
185 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR para 54 
186 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR para 77 
187 Telkom Kenya Ltd. -vs- John Ochwada (2014) eKLR 
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members of the public and other stakeholders to participate in the hearing, determination and 
crafting of appropriate reliefs and resolutions to disputes. 188 
The court fails to appreciate the role of the judiciary in a legal system such as that of Kenya 
where statutes should be in line with the constitution, and administrative regulations in line 
both with legislative statutes and the constitution. 189 Part of the judiciary's role of interpreting 
the law may include making judgments about the validity and applicability of a particular law 
within the context of several superior layers of the legal system. 19° For this reason judges 
have a role in re-establishing the rule of law, detecting legal 'inconsistencies' and 'gaps' and 
providing remedies to defects caused by the excesses of other branches of governrnent. 191 If 
the state is to be prevented from descending into a mechanism of arbitrary control, with little 
accountability to the citizenry it is intended to serve, mechanisms of transparency and 
participation are essential to develop countervailing power. 192 
An analogy is drawn here with the judicial adjudication and enforcement of civil and political 
rights . In arguing for judicial involvement in the enforcement of SERs the same criteria for 
judicial intervention in matters relating to the exercise of political power and civil rights 
used. 193 
This criteria consists in; 194 
• control of the lawful application of that power by the political branches; and 
e the protection of the rights of individuals and minorities granted by the constitution or 
the law 
It appears that the grounds available to the judiciary in protection of civil and political rights 
are the same for SERs. The question then is why limit judicial involvement in the protection 
of socio economic rights to simply a declaration of 1ights and divest it of its remedial 
function? An even stronger case is made when considering that part of the justification for an 
188Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR para 75 
189 The International Commission of Jurists, 'Courts and the Legal Enforcement of ESC Rights: Comparative 
experiences of justiciability', Geneva, 2008, 76 
190 The International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 2008, 76 
191 The International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 2008, 76 
192 Davis M, 'socioeconomic rights: Do they deliver the goods?' International Journal of Constitutional Law, 
July 2008, Pages 687-71 1 -<https:/ /acadernic.oup.com/icon/article/6/3-4/687 /654417> on 30 January 2018 
193 The International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 2008, 76 
194 The International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 2008, 76 
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active role for the judiciary is the protection of the rights of vulnerable minority groups in 
society against abuse from the majority. 195 It only stands to reason that it should be 
particularly important to promote - and not to deny - the participation of judges in the 
adjudication of ESC rights. 196 
Further the involvement of third parties does not necessarily amount to an abdication of 
judicial function because at the relevant point, the matter has been adjudicated and a decree 
of rights issued. An interdict will allow the court to reserve jurisdiction over the case while 
superintending the implementation of its orders by the parties. The involvement of an expert 
third party only gives effect to this remedial function of the judiciary. 197 Mbazira opines that 
the nature of socio economic rights litigation (structural litigation) is that the suits challenge 
large scale government deficiencies, sometimes arising out of organisational or 
administrative failure. 198 The facts in institutional or structural litigation are often complex, 
and much of the judges' efforts are dedicated to fmding an amicable solution acceptable to 
all the parties and which will lead to 
structural reforms. 199 Swart M adds that the nature of the interdict accepts that sociO-
economic rights, in the context of constitutional commitment do require supervision to assist 
with government's' inaction of orders.Z00The violation of socio-economic rights, cmmot be 
remedied by an order that has a once-and-for -all effect and litigants are normally poor and 
cannot come to court over and over.201 
Cesar Rodriguez presents a classic formulation of these cases when he states that;202 
These cases are "structural cases." with the following characteristics 
1. Affect a large number of people who allege a violation of their rights, either directly 
or through organizations that litigate the cause; 
2. Implicate multiple government agencies found to be responsible for pervasive public 
policy failures that contribute to such rights violations; 
195 The International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 2008, 83 
196 The International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 2008, 83 
197 M Wesson 'Grootboom and Beyond Reassessing the Socio -economic jurisprudence of the South African 
Constitutional Court', 2004 SAJHR 306 
198 Mbazira, Litigating Socio-Economic Rights In South Africa, 178. 
199 Mbazira, Litigating Socio-Economic Rights In South Africa, 178. 
200 Swart M "left out in the cold? Crafting Constitutional Remedies for the poorest of the poor" South African 
Journal on Human Rights, 2005, 227 
20 1 Swart M ' left out in the cold?' ,South African Journal on Human Rights, 2005, 227 
202 C. Rodriguez,'Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on Socio-economic Rights in Latin 
America' , Texas Law Review, 2010 - 2011 , 1671 
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3. Involve structural injunctive remedies, i.e., enforcement orders whereby courts 
instruct various government agencies to take coordinated actions to protect the 
entire affected population and not just the specific complainants in the case. 
The foregoing discussion on socio-economic rights litigation suggests that the adjudication 
and implementation of socio-economic rights invites the involvement of various 
organizational and administrative agencies?03 Because of this complex nature of these 
matters, a court cannot simply stop at declaration of rights but must go further and 
supervise their implementation (even with the help of experts) when necessary. 204 Such 
action cannot in proper light be claimed to be abdication of judicial function. 
In fact it is manifestly clear that stopping at declaratory orders when the situation calls for 
post judgement supervision, is an abdication of judicial function (emphasis mine) . 
4.3.3. The Transformative Nature of the 2010 Constitution and the 
Authority of Foreign Precedent 
The Court of Appeal espoused the view that Article 23 (3) of the Kenya Constitution that 
pem1its the High Court to grant an appropriate relief should not be construed to be 
provision that permits the High Court to borrow legislations from other countries and 
through judicial interpretation embed them into the laws of Kenya. 205 
This argument fails to recognise the transformative nature of the constitution of Kenya 
203 Mbazira, Litigating Socio-Economic Rights In South Africa, 178 
204 C. Rodriguez, 'Beyond the Courtroom', Texas Law Review, 2010- 2011 , 1671 
205 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR para 112 
44 
promulgated in 2010. In its enactment, Kenya came of age in terms of recognising the 
importance of socio-economic rights and their role in democratic govemance?06 In the case 
of John Kabui Mwai & 3 others v Kenya National Examination Council & 2 others [2011} 
eK.LR, the court stated that the transformative agenda of the Constitution of Kenya looks 
beyond merely guaranteeing abstract equality but also is a commitment to transform Kenya 
from a society based on socio-economic deprivation to one based on equal and equitable 
distribution of resources under Articles 6(3) and 10 (2) (b).207 Davis and Klare explain 
transformative ideology as consisting of an approach to legal problems informed by the 
constitutional values and aspirations of the bill of rights in laying the foundations of a just, 
democratic and egalitarian order. 208 
In addressing the transformative nature of Kenya's 2010 constitution, Professor Yash Ghai 
describes a transformative constitution as one which aims not only to change the purposes 
and structures of the state, but also society?09 It is one that, emphasizes social and sometimes 
economic change, and requires state organs, particularly the judiciary, to use the 
constitution as a framework for policies and acts for broader shaping of state and 
society. 2 10 
That the state must undertake positive initiatives and legislation, and in cases of failure, 
courts may instruct them to do so and even elaborate what needs to be done (emphasis 
supplied).2 11 The idea of transfmmative constitutionalism must consist in a commitment to 
substantive equality and improving socio-economic conditions.21 2 
It is in tllis same spirit of transformative constitutionalism that the Supreme Comi of Kenya 
206 Khakula A, 'Enhancing The Realisation and Enforcement of Socio-Economic rights in Kenya: The Minimum 
core obligation and the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts ' 2015, 10 
207 John Kabui M wai & 3 others v Kenya National Examination Council & 2 others [20 11] eKLR, page 5 para 2 
208 Davis D and Klare K, 'Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary Law', South 
African Journal on Human Rights, Vol. 26, No.3, 2010,412 
209 Ghai Y, 'Interpreting Kenya's Transformative Constitution' 2014 available at 
<http:l/awaazmagazine.com/previous/index.php/editors/itern/535-interpreting-kenya-s-transformative-
constitution> - accessed 30 January 2018 · 
210 Ghai Y, 'Interpreting Kenya ' s Transformative Constitution' 2014 
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rendered itself thus in Re Interim Independent Election Commission;213 
'The rules of constitutional inte1pretation do not favour formalistic or positivistic 
approaches (Articles 20(4) and 259(1)). The values and principles articulated in the 
Preamble, in Article I 0, in Chapter 6, and in various provisions, reflect historical, economic, 
social, cultural and political realities and aspirations that are critical in building a robust, 
patriotic and indigenous jurisprudence for Kenya. ' 
Consistent with this ideology, the Supreme Court went ahead to issue a structural interdict in 
Communications Commission Of Kenya & 5 Others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 
Others (2014) eKLR. It is therefore appalling that the Court of Appeal which is subordinate to 
the Supreme Court2 14 would vacate progressive jurisprudence developed by a higher court 
that has considered Kenya's transformative constitution, and instead favour of a formalistic 
and positivistic approach to constitutional interpretation? 15 
The Court of Appeal rightly asserted that 'Kenyan courts should not simply adopt foreign 
jurisprudence without ensuring the context and relevance of the foreign statute that is subject 
·-;f i~~rT>retation-by th~ forei~-~ourt. ;·if6it relied- on. th~;as;~f Ja~bir Singh Rai -v- Estate of 
Tarlochan Singh Rai (2013) , in which the supreme court of Kenya held that;217 
"In the development and growth of our jurisprudence, commonwealth and international 
jurisprudence will continue to be pivotal. However, the Supreme Court will have to avoid 
mechanistic approaches to precedent. It will not be appropriate to pick a precedent from 
India one day, Australia another day, South Africa another, the US yet another, just because 
they seem to suit the immediate occasion. Each of those precedents has its place in the 
jurisprudence of its own country. " 
In tllis regard, it argued that Kenya's constitution does envisage enabling legislation for the 
right of access to adequate housing as opposed to the South African constitution which 
provides for such under Art 26(3).2 18 The court also argued that the Kenya Constitution does 
not have a provision sinlilar to Articles 32 and 226 of the Indian Constitution allow for the 
2 13 Re Interim Independent Election Commission [2011]eKLR, para 86 
2 14 Article 259(1), Constitution of Kenya 2010 
2 15 Re Interim Independent Election Commission [2011]eKLR, para 86 
2 16 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR para 123 
2 17 Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others -v- Estate ofTarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others (2013) eKLR,para 100 
2 18 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR para 123 
46 
f . . d 219 concept o contmumg man amus. 
On this basis the court faulted the trial court for reliance on foreign jurisprudence and for 
being influenced by orders given in the Indian case of Olga Telis & Others -v- Bombay 
Municipal Corporation (1985) Supp. SCR 51 and the orders and directions issued by the 
South African Constitutional Court in the case of Irene Grootboom & others -v- The 
Government of the Republic of South Africa & others (2001) (1) SA 46. 220 
While this analysis is legally sound, it appears that it is not entirely capable of capping the 
use of structural interdicts in Kenya. The court noted that India, Canada and South Africa are 
some of the states that embrace post-judgment supervisory orders.Z21 The supreme court of 
Kenya noted in Communications Commission of Kenya v Royal Media Services Limited that 
India, South Africa, Colombia, Kenya and others have transformative constitutions that 
reflect a vision of transformation.222 Structural interdicts have been issued in these countries 
on the basis of appropriate relief flowing from the transformative nature of their constitutions. 
It cannot therefore stand that interdicts should not apply in Kenya on the basis of differing 
contexts when the transformative ideals are substantially adopted by each constitution of the 
said countries. 223 Indeed the case for structural interdicts turns on provisions of Article 23(3) 
of the Constitution of Kenya under the umbrella of appropriate relief. 224 In fact it is 
noteworthy that the Court of Appeal in the Mitu-Bell case rendered itself thus; 'It is our view 
that if properly crafted to avoid vagueness; a supervisory order can be made pursuant to the 
provisions ofArticle 23 (3). '225 
4.4. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing arguments have challenged the retrogressive judgement of the Court of Appeal 
in capping the use of structural interdicts in Kenya. 226 They provide a competent case that 
argues for structural interdicts for the protection and fulfilment of socio-economic rights in 
Kenya. A case which may aptly be restated in the following three points; 
219 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR para 112 
22° Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR para 120 
221 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR para 101 
222 Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 others [2014] 
eKLR, para 3 77 
223 Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 others -v- Estate ofTarlochan Singh Rai & 4 others (2013) eKLR, para 100 
224 Article 23, Constitution of Kenya (20 1 0) 
225 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR para 112 
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1. The Constitution is the supreme law (lex fundamentalis) of the land and its 
interpretation takes precedence over statutory provisions.Z27 
2. The protection and fulfilment of socio-economic rights invites the involvement of 
various expert organizational and administrative agencies and a mandate by court 
involving these (third) parties in remedying a breach of these rights does not amount 
to an abdication of judicial functions. 228 
3. The court fails to appreciate the transformative nature of the 2010 constitution of 
Kenya and the context in which it was promulgated. Such constitution emphasizes 
social and sometimes economic change, and requires state organs, particularly the 
judiciary, to use the constitution as a framework for policies and acts for broader 
shaping of state and society. 229 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The structural interdict as a constitutional remedy is vital in correcting violations that arise 
from structural settings and are caused by systemic problems while managing the future 
actions of the parties responsible for these breaches.230 Structural interdicts can only achieve 
this function when legally applicable under a transformative legal regime where comts may 
instruct the state to undertake positive initiatives and legislation concerning its constitutional 
227 Article 2(4), Constitution of Kenya 2010 
228 Mbazira, Litigating Socio-Economic Rights In South Africa, 178 
229 Ghai Y, ' Interpreting Kenya's Transformative Constitution' 2014 
230 Mbazira, Litigating Socio-Economic Rights In South Africa, 223. 
48 
duties in cases of failure and even elaborate what needs to be done in cases of uncertainty. 231 
Because of its ongoing nature and considering that its enforcement potentially involves many 
institutions, it must be properly crafted to avoid vagueness.232 
In the case of Moi University v Council of Legal Education & another [20 16} eKLR the court 
canvassed the concept of structural interdicts and enumerated the advantages that accompany 
it. Notably the court while citing Fose vs. Minister of Safety & Security [1977} ZACC 6 
adopted appropriate relief under Art 23(3) to be sufficient legal for interdicts in rendering 
itself thus; 
'One of the remedies which is now recognized in jurisdictions with similar constitutional 
provisions as our Article 23 is what is called structural inierdict. '233 
ln the Kenyan context, the benefits of structural interdicts can be immense and the results 
significant. These may include; 
1. They create a dynamic dialogue between the judiciary and the other branches of 
govemment in the intricacies of implementation of court ordersP 4 
2. They provide an important opportunity for litigants to retum to comi and follow up on 
declaratory or mandatory orders which is especially valuable in cases involving the 
rights of 'poorest of the poor,' who must make the most of rare and costly 
opportunities to litigate.:m 
3. The very process of formulating and presenting a plan to the courts improves 
government accountability, helping officials identify which organ of the State is 
responsible for providing pmiicular services or for ensuring access to specific 
rights?36 
4. Structural interdicts have contributed to a better understanding on the part of 
public authorities of their constitutional legal obligations in particular areas, whilst 
also assisting the judiciary in gaining a valuable insight in the difficulties that 
these authmities encounter in their efforts to comply with their duties.237 
23 1 Ghai Y, 'Interpreting Kenya's Transforrnative Constitution' 2014 
232 Kenya Airports Authority v Mitu-Bell Welfare Society & 2 others [2016] eKLR para 112 
233 Moi University v Council of Legal Education & another [20 16] eKLR, para 211 
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5. Because they are court orders to satisfy constitutional obligations, they help 
authorities comply with otherwise politically unpopular constitutional obligations and 
cushion against pressure from small but politically powerful interest groups opposed 
to certain rights. 238 
6. They provide a better outcome than other remedies in Economic and Social Rights 
litigation. This is because they go beyond remedying an individual violation of these 
rights and provide relief to all members of a similarly situated class, whether or not 
any given individual has the resources to litigate his or her own case.Z39 
However the biggest criticism levelled against the interdict is that it breaches the doctrine of 
separation of powers, because courts can interfere with policy matters while making 
decisions that affect budgetary allocation.Z40 
A case example is that of John Kabui Mwai and 3 Others v Kenya National Examinations 
Council & Other {20ll}eKLR in which this same concern was raised albeit concerning the 
nature of socio-economic rights. The court opined;241 
"Socio-economic rights are by their nature ideologically loaded. The realization of these 
rights involves the maldng of ideological challenges which, among others, impact on the 
nature of the country's economic systems. This is because these rights engender positive 
obligations and have budgetary implications which require making political choices. In our 
view, a public body should be given appropriate leeway in determining the best way of 
meeting its constitutional obligations." 
However, the court in this case noted that due to inadequacy of resources in providing socio-
economic goods and services to everyone on demand as individual rights, there has to be a 
holistic approach that focuses beyond the individual.242 
This is the more reason for using structural interdicts because they afford relief to a class of 
people instead of individual relief only which may well tum out to be prohibitively expensive 
when a large number of people are affected.Z43 
On the question of separation of powers, care has to be taken as to not allow the judiciary to 
238 Moi University v Council of Legal Education & another [20 16] eKLR, para 211 
239 Moi University v Council of Legal Education & another [20 16] eKLR, para 211 · 
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24 1 John Kabui Mwai and 3 Others v Kenya National Examinations Council & Others, Nairobi Petition No. 15 
of2011 eKLR 
242 John Kabui Mwai and 3 Others v Kenya National Examinations Council & Other [2011]eKLR 
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manifestly interfere with the role and function of other arms of the government. This same 
position was held by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Soobramoney v Minister of 
Health, Kwazulu-Natal (1998) where the court held that;244 
A court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political 
organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such matters. 
It is important that a balance has to be struck between the protection and fulfilment of socio-
economic rights having respect to the territorial integrity of the arms of government. 
If remedies such as the structural interdicts are to succeed, it is a recommendation that 
lawyers and litigators dedicate sufficient effort in substantively elaborating on the most 
appropriate remedies for the redress of the violations in question.245 To achieve the 
transformative aspirations of the 2010 Constitution, especially in relation to the entrenched 
justiciable SERs, both practitioners and the courts must contemplate, develop, adopt and 
employ more creative and innovative remedies for the redress of SERs, as has been done in 
national jurisdictions that have recently adopted transformative constituting documents such 
as Canad-~-and So~tl; -Afu~a.246 
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